INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR CURBING ELECTORAL CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: A POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Abstract
Electoral corruption in Nigeria, characterized by vote buying, rigging, and manipulation, poses a persistent threat to democratic consolidation, undermining public trust and distorting electoral outcomes. This paper provides a critical analysis of institutional mechanisms designed to curb electoral corruption, focusing on the policy and administrative roles of key actors such as the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), legal frameworks, anti-corruption agencies (EFCC, ICPC), and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The study identifies systemic challenges, including pervasive political interference, weak enforcement of electoral laws, the monetization of elections, and judicial bottlenecks, which significantly hinder the effectiveness of existing mechanisms. Employing a qualitative research approach, this paper synthesizes recent legislative reforms (Electoral Act 2022), case studies of electoral corruption (2023 elections), and comparative policy measures from successful democracies like Ghana, South Africa, and India. Findings emphasize that while institutional frameworks are in place, their efficacy is compromised by implementation deficits, political manipulation, and resource constraints. To effectively mitigate electoral corruption, the paper advocates for robust enforcement through specialized tribunals, enhanced public participation through civic education, and the strategic integration of technological innovations like block chain and AI for transparency. Recommendations include strengthening INEC's autonomy, enhancing campaign finance regulations, and fostering media pluralism. This study contributes to the ongoing discourse on electoral integrity by providing actionable policy recommendations informed by empirical evidence and comparative insights, aiming to build a more resilient and inclusive democracy in Nigeria.
Keywords
Electoral Corruption, Democratic Consolidation, INEC, Institutional Reform, Policy Analysis